Discretion, rules and volatility - commentary by Robert A. Becker
1 Shell (1971) discusses the dou-
ble inﬁnity of traders and mar-
kets as the source of the overlap-
ping generations model’s
interesting economic properties.
2 Battle of the Sexes can also be
interpreted as a game where
two ﬁrms choose a product stan-
dard. They are better off (obtain
higher proﬁts) by operating on a
common standard than when
they adopt different standards.
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iscussions of rules vs. discretion have
occupied a central place in the analy-
sis of macroeconomic policies in
dynamic models. Costas Azariadis and
Vincenzo Galasso have presented a new
model that shows how a discretionary poli-
cy regime can lead to a more volatile ﬁscal
policy than one pursued under a constitu-
tional rule. They set up a simple ﬁscal poli-
cy story and examine the potential for
discretionary policy to produce cyclical or
chaotic dynamics that they regard as a
volatile outcome.
I discuss their results by reasoning with
analogy to games of tacit cooperation and
bargaining. In particular, I argue that some
classical insights of Thomas Schelling can
help us understand the reason discretionary
policies in the Azariadis and Galasso model
can generate multiple equilibria and the ap-
pearance of a random ﬁscal policy, whereas
a regime of rules does not.
The Azariadis and Galasso model is
based on the simplest overlapping genera-
tions model. The only policy variable in
their framework is the choice of a social se-
curity transfer payment from the young
generation to the old generation. Their
model of discretionary policy is the deter-
mination of the level of the transfer by a
median voter or majoritarian voting
arrangement. Because the median voter can
costlessly change the transfer at each time,
this is a discretionary regime. This model
has multiple equilibria that reﬂects a fun-
damental indeterminacy problem. Some of
these equilibria can also be dynamically in-
efﬁcient, although they are all individually
rational and satisfy a subgame perfection
constraint. Volatility takes the form of a
potentially cyclic or chaotic transfer se-
quence. Fiscal policy can appear to be ran-
dom even though it is generated by a deter-
ministic dynamic process. In contrast,
Azariadis and Galasso show that the con-
stitutional rule produces a different result.
The indeterminacy problem disappears,




The conduct of ﬁscal policy in the
Azariadis and Galasso overlapping genera-
tions model is a tacit coordination game.
The model’s structure shows that players
can improve their welfare if they devise
an appropriate pay-as-you-go social secu-
rity system. This is the only possible ﬁs-
cal policy in their story. The demographic
makeup of the game excludes the possi-
bility that the generations can communi-
cate and thereby reconcile their common
interests in conducting a suitable ﬁscal
policy. The double inﬁnity of traders and
markets implies that Julius Caesar cannot
communicate with Bill Clinton, who 
in turn is unable to communicate with
that famous 24th century resident Capt.
Picard, and so on.1 Coordination of ﬁscal
policy requires Caesar to form expecta-
tions about Clinton and so forth into the
indeﬁnite future. The impossibility of
doing this produces the multiple equilib-
ria that drives Azariadis and Galasso’s
volatility result.
Schelling (1960) referred to a strategic
situation where individuals have common
interests but cannot communicate with
each other as a tacit coordination game.
Examples include the Battle of the Sexes,
which is depicted in Figure 1. Two players
prefer to be with each other on a date than
to not be with each other. Player 1 (the
row player) prefers to go to an opera,
whereas player 2 (the column player)
prefers to attend a ball game. The payoff
cells show how coordination or matching
is better than failure to coordinate or pro-
ducing a mismatch.2
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Battle of the Sexes has two pure-strategy
Nash equilibria indicated by the black spot
in the corresponding payoff cells. A third
equilibrium strategy exists for this game. It
is a mixed strategy where each player selects
one of the pure strategies with a randomiz-
ing device. Player 1 chooses the ball game
with probability 2/3 and goes to the opera
with probability 1/3. The second player
chooses the ball game with probability 1/3
and the opera with probability 2/3. This
mixed-strategy equilibrium also pays each
player, on average, less than either pure-
strategy equilibrium would pay. This is so
because the mixed-strategy equilibrium can
produce a mismatch where the players fail
to coordinate their strategies.
I contend that this simple, well-known
coordination game produces the same
qualitative features of the majoritarian vot-
ing game modeled by Azariadis and
Galasso. Of course, their article offers a sig-
niﬁcant twist to tacit coordination games.
The overlapping generations model creates
inﬁnitely many coordination problems.
Shell (1971) suggested the Hilbert-
Gamow Hotel as a metaphorical way of
understanding the paradoxes arising in an
overlapping generations model.3 This hotel
has countably many rooms and always has
one guest in each room. A new patron can
always be accommodated by assigning her
to the ﬁrst room and moving everyone else
one room number higher. Hence, this
hotel is always full and at the same time
can always show its vacancy sign.
Now suppose that we modify this
hotel story and create a tacit coordination
game according to the following rules.
There are countably many players; each
one currently resides in one of the hotel’s
rooms. A cash prize is offered to all guests,
provided they all congregate in the same
room and participate in an awards cere-
mony. If they do not, they receive nothing.
Each guest would prefer to have the meet-
ing take place in his room rather than bear
the cost of hiking to another room. Each
guest would also rather walk to another
guest’s room rather than miss out on the
cash prize. A payoff sequence {p1, p2,
p3,...} gives the payoffs to each player for
each particular strategy choice he can
make. For example, the payoff sequence
where everyone chooses to go to room 1 
is {2, 1, 1, ...}. If at least one person goes
to a different room, then the players get
{0, 0, 0, ...}. Similarly, the payoff sequence
is {1, 2, 1, 1, ...} when everybody locates
in room 2, is {0, 0, 0, ...} if someone be-
haves differently, and so on. A player’s best
response depends on what he expects the
other guests to choose. For instance,
player 1 will choose to stay in his room if
he expects everyone else to come to his
room, but he will go to room 10 if he
thinks everyone else will be there too. In
the ﬁrst case, he earns $2 and in the sec-
ond case $1. Both outcomes are better
than the zero payoff he gets if he mis-
matches. Hence, he will always try for a
match. The same logic works for the other
players. There are an inﬁnite number of
pure-strategy equilibria in this game. It al-
ways pays to be in the same room as
everyone else when the ceremony starts,
and it never pays to be in a different room
than the other guests.
The fact that there are at least a count-
able number of pure-strategy equilibria in
this game does not really solve the game. A
guest aware that there are inﬁnitely many
equilibria still does not know what to do.
There is no way to tell a guest to which
room he should go. Mixed strategies only
make things worse because random play
will produce some mismatches. Reasoning
by analogy to the two-player game, one
3 This story originates in Gamow
(1988), which was originally
published in 1946. Shell
(1971) adapted this story to
discuss the economics of the
overlapping generations model
and explain the inefﬁciency of
competitive allocations discov-
ered by Samuelson (1958).
Shell attributes the hotel story to
Gamow, who in turn credits
David Hilbert.
Figure 1
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would expect mixed strategies to exist and
produce payoffs on average worse than any
of the pure-strategy equilibria.
The problem with this meeting room
game is that each guest must form expec-
tations about which room he or she ex-
pects the other guests to select as the com-
mon meeting room. There is no way to pin
down the expectations of the guest in the
ﬁrst room since that expectation inevitably
depends on what the asymptotic guest at
inﬁnity will do.
The coordination game played by
Azariadis and Galasso’s overlapping gener-
ations model players is no different. There
is no way for the median voter in any gen-
eration to determine how the median voter
at inﬁnity will behave. This is driven by
the critical demographic feature of the
overlapping generations model that pre-
vents agents from communicating across
time. It is not surprising that many possi-
ble equilibria may exist, and among them
some might involve the analog of a mixed
strategy that in Azariadis and Galasso’s
world would amount to a volatile transfer
policy sequence.
RULES AND BARGAINING
The problem with ﬁscal policy in the
majoritarian voting game is that there is
no focal point. There is no strategy or ﬁs-
cal policy that agents can somehow see as
the obvious way to play their coordination
games. The condition of subgame perfec-
tion is a necessary but not a sufﬁcient con-
dition to solve the Azariadis and Galasso
coordination game.
The case of a constitutional rule is 
different, and Schelling’s work gives us a
clue as to why this is so. Schelling wrote
the following passage in his classic The
Strategy of Conﬂict (p. 22), in the context
of strategic choice in bargaining situations:
The essence of these tactics is
some voluntary but irreversible
sacriﬁce of freedom of choice.
They rest on the paradox that the
power to constrain an adversary
may depend on the power to bind
oneself; that, in bargaining, weak-
ness is often strength, freedom
may be freedom to capitulate, and
to burn bridges behind one may
sufﬁce to undo an opponent. 
This strategic principle also applies to
some coordination games. In those cases,
it can be used to cut through the multiple
equilibria and produce a single equilib-
rium that solves the game. For example, in
Battle of the Sexes, one partner can obtain
a ﬁrst mover advantage. This is done by
calling the other and declaring that she
will be at the ball game and then hanging
up. The caller then proceeds to cut off all
communication until game time. This
means he or she disconnects the fax, e-
mail, phone, cellular phone, answering
machine, and beeper. He or she goes to the
game. What does the partner do? The ﬁrst
mover advantage is obtained by taking an
irrevocable act.4 This is easy to display
using the extensive form game shown in
Figure 2. The capacity of the ﬁrst player to
constrain himself or herself is modeled by
giving that player the ﬁrst move. This
player has the right to precommit by tak-
ing the opening move. Simple backward
induction shows that player 2 will show
up at the ball game.
The same logic used to study Battle of
the Sexes operates in the Azariadis and
Galasso ﬁscal policy game with a constitu-
tion. The critical assumption is the irrevo-
cability of the constitution. This means,
that by assumption, all generations are
committed to follow the constitutional
4 If the act taken is revocable or
costless, the resulting action is
called cheap talkby game theo-
rists. Cheap talk by itself does
not change the set of equilibria
in Battle of the Sexes. The coor-
dination problem persists.
Figure 2rule when they are born and no revolution
can overturn it.
Each young person in this overlap-
ping generations model has two direct ad-
versaries—the current generation and the
to-be-born next generation. The constitu-
tion acts as a constraint on the current
generation’s transfer policy proposal. The
constitution gives the current generation
the right to propose a change in the sta-
tus quo, but gives the old generation the
veto. The agenda setting of the young
gives them a ﬁrst mover advantage that is
constrained by the constitution. The
young give up the right to drive the old
generation to their subsistence level by
use of this rule. The current generation
also does this because it wants the next
generation to treat it in the same way.
The golden-rule payoff emerges (as a sta-
tionary subgame perfect equilibrium) be-
cause the constitution compels golden-
rule behavior. Each generation does unto
its elders what it will want the next gen-
eration to do unto it during its old age.
This constrains the current younger gen-
eration’s behavior and supports the
golden-rule outcome. The constitutional
rule removes the coordination problem,




The use of a constitutional rule rather
than majoritarian discretion to resolve the
coordination problem is an interesting ap-
proach to comparing ﬁscal policy institu-
tions. However, I do feel there is a slight
weakness in the constitutional argument.
The players do not voluntarily sacriﬁce
anything to precommit, since the key
modeling assumption regarding the irrevo-
cability of the constitution is already in
place before the ﬁrst generation must
make a decision. Azariadis and Galasso
seem to be making an implicit assumption
that all agents agree to a constitutional
arrangement behind a veil of ignorance.5
Agents do not know which generation
they will belong to before the creation of
their world. Therefore, agents agree to the
Azariadis and Galasso constitutional rule
as a way of ensuring their equal treatment
after the veil is dropped and time begins.
Azariadis and Galasso’s implicit use of
the veil of ignorance seems to me an artiﬁ-
cial device that allows agents to avoid mak-
ing the sacriﬁces called for by Schelling’s
commitment principle. Agents bind them-
selves behind the veil of ignorance but do
not give up real resources or bear a real
cost at that time. They cannot renege on
their commitment to constitutional rule
because it is assumed to be impossible, not
because it might not be in their best inter-
est. I believe young agents should have to
make a costly commitment during their
youthful period to constrain their elders’
behaviors, as well as the behavior of next
period’s young people. The game model
should include the device used to bind
players as part of their strategic choices.
Azariadis and Galasso have certainly given
us some hints about how they might do
this. I think solving that problem is central
if they are to provide a convincing argu-
ment for the superiority of rules as a way of
eliminating undesirable volatility in this
type of coordination game.
The central volatility result for the dis-
cretionary policy regime and the corre-
sponding Folk-like Theorem do not ad-
dress the explicit welfare of the cyclic or
chaotic equilibrium transfer schemes.
There is certainly a strong presumption
that they are dynamically inefﬁcient, just
as the mixed strategy equilibrium of Battle
of the Sexes is inefﬁcient. However, this
needs a proof. Hence, it would be interest-
ing to show that the equilibria in their ex-
ample exhibiting complicated dynamics
are in fact inefﬁcient. Otherwise, declaring
the volatility property of those equilibria a
bad thing would seem to rest on grounds
other than welfare considerations.
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